Introduction: Populism in the 21st Century: Critical reflections on a global phenomenon by Bossetta, Michael & Husted, Emil
Politik	 	 Nummer 4 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
	
 1 
Introduction: Populism in the 21st 




Michael Bossetta, PhD fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Copenha-
gen 
 




Thus far, the 21st century has ushered in a period of high volatility in established politi-
cal systems across the world. The current climate of political instability is, in many 
ways, the result of longer-term trends coming to a head. Rising social inequality, in-
creased migration flows, and technological advancements in industrial production have 
driven a neo-liberal, globalized economy that has altered the power structures of ad-
vanced and developing countries alike (Kriesi 2013). Poverty and unemployment have 
risen, national populations are more diverse than ever before, and urban concentration 
threatens the prosperity and sustainability of rural regions. The changing social and po-
litical landscape, compounded by more recent developments like international terrorism 
and global financial crises, has proven a difficult terrain for national governments to 
effectively navigate when responding to popular grievances (Held 2006). 
Filling the void, new challengers to the political arena have emerged. They chas-
tise the failures of mainstream elites and offer alternative, controversial agendas. Taking 
the form of political parties but also social movements, these outsiders hail from across 
the political spectrum and claim to represent the sovereign will of the people. Today, the 
so-called ‘populists’ are garnering unprecedented media attention and electoral support 
in nearly every corner of the globe.  
In Europe, the results of the 2014 European Parliament elections were largely in-
terpreted as a populist backlash, giving rise to the success of Eurosceptic parties. At the 
domestic level, right-wing populist parties have garnered a parliamentary foothold – and 
in some cases governmental power – in countries across Western, Northern, and Eastern 
Europe. Typically, this right-wing variety of populism incorporates a cultural dimension 
that advocates restricting immigration and advances traditional, conservative values 
(Mudde 2013). Expressions of European right-wing populism include the Front Nation-
al in France, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and the Danish People’s Party in 
Denmark, but the phenomenon is far from limited to parliamentary politics. Social 
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movements like PEGIDA and the Soldiers of Odin are likewise regarded as representa-
tives of right-wing populism. The left-wing variety of populism, meanwhile, is most 
prevalent in Southern Europe and is generally couched in economic terms, for example 
in rejection of EU austerity measures in response to the Eurozone crisis (Stavrakakis 
and Katsambekis 2014). Here, the most notable examples include SYRIZA in Greece, 
Podemos in Spain, and to some extent also Alternativet in Denmark (Husted and Han-
sen 2017). 
The populist phenomenon, however, is by no means limited to Europe. In the 
United States, both right- and left-wing populist manifestations can be observed in fac-
tions of the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. The election of Donald 
Trump confirmed the appeal of a right-wing populist message to the American elec-
torate, while the ‘Economic Populism’ of Democrats like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth 
Warren resonates with leftist voters concerned with social inequality (The Economist 
2017). In Latin America, the history of left-wing populism is rich and spearheaded by 
leaders like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Juan Perón in Argentina, and Evo Morales in 
Bolivia (Hawkins 2009). The populist label has also been applied to contemporary Asia-
Pacific leaders like Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, Shinzō Abe of Japan, Narendra 
Modi of India, and Pauline Hanson of Australia (Moffitt 2016; Chacko and Jayasuriya 
2017). 
The sheer diversity of contexts to which the term ‘populism’ has been applied 
begs the question: What is populism, exactly? The term was first used in the United 
States in connection with the People’s Party: a short-lived, left-wing political party 
borne out of agrarian unrest in the American South at the end of the 19th century 
(Goodwyn 1976). However, populist manifestations extend much further back in time 
than the etymology of the term itself. In fact, we can trace populism as far back as the 
Ancient Greeks and the iron-fisted, Athenian general Cleon in 400BC. Cleon was the 
first common citizen to join the Athenian political class, and he regularly accused the 
political elite of putting rhetoric and sophistry ahead of fair judgment, which was better 
exercised by “ordinary men” (see, for example, The Mytilenean Debate in Thucydides, 
History 3.37). In the interim between then and now, several transformative political 
actors and events throughout history share elements of populism: Robespierre and the 
French Revolution, the American Federalists and the signing of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, Hitler and the Völkisch Movement underpinning the Weimar Republic. In 
each case, a socially constructed ‘people’ were placed in contrast with the existing rul-
ing elite, and significant political transformations followed suit.  
From the examples outlined above, populism is seemingly a truly global phe-
nomenon and a recurring feature of history. However, just within the past decade the 
concept of populism has received a resurgence of attention in the academic literature, 
particularly – but not exclusively – among European scholars. To introduce readers of 
this volume to some of the existing understandings of populism, we outline four theoret-
ical perspectives on the concept below (for a more exhaustive list, see Pappas 2016). 
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Table 1: Overview of the most prominent perspectives on populism. 
 
 
Perspective Main characteristics Key theorists 
Populism as an ide-
ology 
Populism is an ideology that considers 
society split into two homogeneous 
groups: the pure people vs. the corrupt 
elite. However, it is a thin ideology be-
cause it lacks political consistency and 
attaches itself to thick ideologies like lib-





Populism as a style 
Populism is a style of political representa-
tion that includes the discursive content 
of what politicians say, as well as the per-
formative elements that accompany dis-
course, for example: rhetorical devices, 
gestures, staging, attire, accents, and 
mannerisms. Populists appeal to ‘the 
people’, talk or act in unconventional 
ways, and conjure a sense of crisis 




Populism as a 
movement 
Populism is an undemocratic movement 
that primarily exists on the right side of 
the political spectrum. It is characterized 
as anti-pluralist in the sense that its pro-
ponents see themselves as the only rep-
resentatives of the ‘true’ people and ex-
cludes those who do not belong to this 
category. Populism should be fought with 
liberal democratic means. 
Jan-Werner Müller 
Robert Jansen 
Populism as a logic 
Populism is a logic of articulation that 
unifies political identities in equivalential 
chains against a common adversary. The 
adversary is often known as ‘the elite’ or 
‘the establishment’, but this is not a giv-
en. Populism is not a distinct trait of par-
ticular movements or parties, but an in-
tegral part of all political projects. As 
such, the end of populism coincides with 
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The preeminent view among academics is that populism is best conceptualized as an 
ideology (Canovan 2002; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013), although more recently schol-
ars have argued that populism is better approached as a political style (Moffitt and 
Tormey 2014; Bossetta 2017), a political movement (Jansen 2011; Müller, 2016), or a 
logic of articulation (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005; Howarth 2007). In the table above, we 
have outlined the main characteristics of these four perspectives, in an effort to supply 
the reader with a – somewhat simplified – overview of the literature on populism before 
embarking on the forthcoming articles. 
As this overview shows, the four perspectives share some similarities. For in-
stance, all four hold that populism establishes some kind of antagonistic relationship 
between people and elite – or, at least between ‘underdog’ and ‘topdog’. That said, there 
are also several major differences, revolving around questions like: Is populism limited 
to one side of the political spectrum? Are some ideological elements axiomatic to all 
expressions of populism? Is populism compatible with democracy? Should we try to 
eliminate populism, or is it an integral part of the democratic process? Such disagree-
ments have led some observers to question the concept's usefulness, based on the 
grounds that populism lacks any kind of positive content (see Mudde and Kaltwasser 
2013). While we acknowledge the need to specify populism in positive terms and refine 
the concept's analytical utility, we also posit that the diversity of populism theories pro-
vides fertile ground for developing innovative, comparative research designs that can 
yield empirical discovery. The plurality of approaches to the concept allows researchers 
to compare an array of different empirical cases, while also allowing for multiple views 
on the same phenomenon. And if that is not constitutive of healthy scientific and/or 
democratic debate, then what is?  
 
 
Outline of the special issue 
 
At the outset of this special issue, we asked the authors to engage critically with the 
concept of populism, and each of the contributions accomplishes this task. Through a 
variety of novel theoretical and empirical perspectives, the articles raise a number of 
provoking arguments that challenge longstanding assumptions about populism. While 
some articles, such as Allan Dreyer Hansen’s piece on populism as an articulatory logic 
and the interview with Jan-Werner Müller (conducted by Niels Boel, Carsten Jensen, 
and André Sonnichsen), are driven by theoretical aspirations, they still draw on a range 
of empirical examples to support their claims. The other articles – Jørgen Bæk Simon-
sen’s piece on Islamic populism, Kristoffer Holt and André Haller’s piece on 
PEGIDA’s relationship with mainstream media, and Lazaros Karavasilis’ piece on 
right-wing populism in the Greek public sphere – analyze distinct empirical phenomena 
but still engage critically with the concept of populism. We hope that, through reading 
the diverse range of empirical cases, theoretical approaches, and research designs in-
cluded in this issue, the reader will get a better sense of what populism actually is but 
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also – and perhaps more importantly – be inspired to pursue his or her own study of 
populism within other disciplines and in other empirical contexts. In the following, we 
will provide a brief description of each of the five articles: 
Article 1 by Allan Dreyer Hansen (2017) revisits Laclau’s seminal theory of 
populism as a political logic of articulation. From the outset, Hansen questions the no-
tion that populism is necessarily undemocratic, which has been advanced most recently 
by Jan-Werner Müller (see interview in this issue). Hansen does so by conducting an 
illustrative analysis of the 1934 Danish Social Democrats’ party program, ‘Danmark for 
Folket’ (Denmark for the People), which marked a corner stone in the history of the 
party. With this program, the Social Democrats went from being a class-party focused 
on the working class to becoming a mass-party focused on the people as a whole. The 
Social Democrats would remain Denmark’s largest party for the rest of the century, thus 
playing a key role in the constitution of what is today known as the Nordic welfare 
state. It may seem surprising to use precisely this program as an illustration of populism 
in action, but Hansen’s point is that populism should not be understood as a particular 
ideology or movement, but as the practice of unifying political identities in equivalential 
chains against a common adversary. This is done by organizing the chain of political 
identities around an ‘empty signifier’ (i.e. a signifier without a signified). In the case of 
the Social Democrats, the empty signifier is the notion of ‘the people’, which is posi-
tioned in an agonistic relationship with ‘Capital’. All political projects, regardless of 
ideological affiliations, employ this practice to a greater or lesser extent. Hence, the 
more general point in Hansen’s article is that populism is present in varying degrees in 
all kinds of politics (even in the most technocratic and institutionalized political pro-
jects), which is why it makes little sense to conceive of populism as undemocratic par 
excellence. 
Article 2 by Jørgen Bæk Simonsen (2017) departs from the intriguing question: 
If populism is conceived as an anti-pluralist phenomenon emerging in reaction to ‘the 
establishment’, does it then only exist in pluralist and democratic societies, or is it pos-
sible to detect populist tendencies in less democratic contexts? In other words, does it 
make sense to speak of populism in more totalitarian societies? Simonsen’s answer is 
clearly affirmative. To illustrate this point, Simonsen takes the reader on a historical 
journey through 20th century Egypt and Iran. In the case of Egypt, he shows that the 
success of The Muslim Brotherhood in the 1930’s and 1940’s was very much predicated 
on the persistent articulation of ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ Muslim values in opposition to the 
more secular values that dominated Egypt society in the wake of British colonialization. 
Similarly, in the case of Iran, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini can likewise be interpreted 
as a successful attempt at splitting Iranian society into two antagonistic camps: Support-
ers of the secular Shah dynasty vs. supporters of Khomeini’s Islamic program. While 
the former group was framed as traitors and Western lackeys, the latter was described as 
the ‘authentic’ people of Iran, thus providing Khomeini with a pretext for instigating the 
revolt against the Shah in 1979. These two examples serve to illustrate that, although 
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populism may be a relatively modern phenomenon, it does not require a democratic and 
pluralist set-up to flourish. 
Article 3 by Kristoffer Holt and André Haller (2017) casts its empirical gaze 
on the social media communication of the PEGIDA movement and offers a comparative 
analysis of PEGIDA Facebook pages in four countries: Germany, Austria, Norway, and 
Sweden. In particular, Holt and Haller set out to investigate how these national 
PEGIDA chapters used Facebook to criticize the mainstream media as ‘Lügenpresse’ 
(the ‘lying press’) at the height of the refugee crisis in 2015. The authors find that in all 
four countries, the PEGIDA movement expresses a deep skepticism of the mainstream 
media. However, interestingly and going against their original hypothesis, the authors 
also find that PEGIDA references the media affirmatively. That is, PEGIDA will posi-
tively reference and disseminate mainstream media content on Facebook when it sup-
ports PEGIDA’s own position on immigration or migrants. Holt and Haller’s compara-
tive analysis also detects significant differences in how the national chapters use social 
media to reference traditional media outlets. The Swedish Facebook page, for instance, 
differs from the other three in that it rarely contests the media but, when it does, tends to 
do so by linking indirectly to alternative media sites. In Germany, Austria, and Norway, 
PEGIDA Facebook pages tended to reference mainstream media more often and direct-
ly attack specific statements included in their articles. The analysis also uncovers differ-
ences in terms of PEGIDA’s affirmative references to mainstream media online. 
PEGIDA’s German and Austrian chapters were aimed at confirming their position or 
legitimizing the movement, whereas in Sweden and Norway the Facebook pages were 
more used to promote events or engage with supporters. The findings ultimately suggest 
that PEGIDA has a selective relationship with the mainstream media on Facebook, and 
not all references degrade the media as ‘Lügenpresse’. 
Article 4 by Lazaros Karavasilis (2017) centers on the interesting question: 
when emerging as a left-wing phenomenon, how is populism framed in right-wing, al-
ternative media spaces online? Karavasilis explores the Greek discourse about populism 
through a study of the website ‘Anti-news’, which hosts opinions from anonymous con-
tributors ranging from center- to extreme-right. Finding that references to populism on 
the site have dramatically increased from 2010-2016 in the wake of the European eco-
nomic crisis, Karavasilis shows that that the right-wing in Greece has taken up an elitist 
position of ‘anti-populism’. Running counter to most European conceptions of popu-
lism, the article argues that in Greece, the populism promoted by left-wing parties such 
as SYRIZA is interpreted by the right as non-progressive and subversive to ‘common 
sense’: pursuing a liberal economic development through closer ties with the European 
Union. Interestingly, Karavasilis argues that right-wing ‘anti-populists’ in Greece view 
left-wing populism as traditional and anachronistic. At the same time, anti-populists 
consider a return to ethnocentrism and state regulation the primary means to counteract 
populism and modernize Greece in the 21st century economy. The article raises provok-
ing questions about whether nativism is a defining feature of populism or, if notions of 
national identity can be used by anti-populists to promote a progressive agenda. 
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Article 5 is based on an interview with Jan-Werner Müller, conducted by Niels Boel, 
Carsten Jensen, and André Sonnichsen in Vienna (Boel et al., 2017). Throughout the 
interview, Müller sustains his core argument that populism is an undemocratic and anti-
pluralist movement spearheaded and personified by politicians like Donald Trump, Ma-
rine Le Pen, and Viktor Orbán. According to Müller, populism is exclusionary and, 
thus, anti-pluralist in at least two ways. First, it is exclusionary against the elites, be-
cause populists refuse to recognize the moral legitimacy of other political candidates, 
and because ‘the elite’ always serves as the number one scapegoat in populist rhetoric. 
Müller refers to this as the populist claim to a ‘monopoly of representation’. Secondly, 
populism is exclusionary against common people who do not share the views of the 
populist. These people, Müller claims, risk having their status as part of ‘the people’ 
revoked by the populist – the most obvious example being Trump’s verbal attacks on 
‘all other people’ but the real people. At different points during the interview, Müller is 
asked to ponder the difference between right-wing and left-wing populism. While he 
maintains that populism is far more prevalent on the right, he does not deny the possi-
bility of a left-wing populism, citing Chavez as the most prominent example. However, 
contrary to theorists like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, he does not see left-wing 
populism as a vehicle for challenging the hegemony of neo-liberalism and revitalizing 
liberal democracy. As he puts it: “Populism is always detrimental to democracy”. 
Taken together, the five articles included here illustrate the level of diversity that 
currently characterizes the state of populism research. The works differ in their theoreti-
cal understanding of populism as well as the empirical cases studied: ranging from au-
thoritarian Egypt in the 1900’s to consolidated democracies in contemporary Europe. 
Some critics might argue that the range of perspectives and cases included in this issue 
serve to dilute the analytical utility of populism scholarship. As editors, we would argue 
the opposite: that a broad and inclusive understanding of populism yields exciting ave-
nues for innovative, comparative research. As a grand theory of populism seems unlike-
ly to emerge in the near future, and charges of populism as an empty signifier continue 
to mount, we wish to encourage scholars to embrace the void and engage openly (and 
critically) with the concept as a means to shed light on existing social, cultural, and po-
litical phenomena. Populism is but one lens that attempts to ascertain the complexity of 
modern day politics. It is neither a sufficient cause nor reducible effect of this complexi-
ty. Nevertheless, critical reflections regarding how populism can help make sense of 
political phenomena – or not – are useful to further our understanding of contemporary 
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